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[ V o l . 7 8 through the network. 7 Both private and common uses are essential. Without the private aspects, the Internet would collapse from overuse and abuse; without the common ones, it would be pointlessly barren. But the two together are magical; their combination makes the Internet hum. Semicommons theory also tells us, however, that we should expect difficult tensions between these two very different ways of managing resources. 8 Because private control and open-to-all-comers common access necessarily coexist on the Internet, it has had to develop distinctive institutions to make them play nicely together. These institutions include the technical features and community norms that play central roles in Post's and Zittrain's books: everything from the layered architecture of the Internet's protocols 9 to Wikipedia editors' efforts to model good behavior. 10 As I'll argue, the dynamic interplay between private and common isn't just responsible for the Internet's success; it also explains some enduring tensions in Internet law, reveals the critical importance of some of the Internet's design decisions, and provides a fresh perspective on the themes of freedom and collaboration that Post and Zittrain explore.
Here's how I'll proceed: In Part II of this essay, I'll set up the problem. Part II.A will use Post's and Zittrain's books to describe two critical facts about the Internet-it's designed and used in ways that require substantial sharing and openness, and it's sublimely gigantic. Part II.B will explain why this openness is problematic for traditional property theory, which sees resources held in common as inherently wasteful. Part II.C will explain how commons theory can make sense of commonly held resources, but only at the price of introducing a new problem: an internal tension about the scale at which these resources should be held. The theory of tangible common-pool resources tells a tragic story that emphasizes the need to keep the group of those with access to the commons small. But the theory of peer-produced intellectual property tells a happier tale, one that emphasizes the importance of massive collaboration-of openness to as many people as possible.
In Part III, I'll resolve this tension between pressures for smallness and pressures for bigness by showing how a semicommons can accommodate both. Part III.A will introduce Henry Smith's theory of the semicommons, which he illustrates with the example of fields open to common grazing for sheep but held in private for farming. Part III.B will explain how treating the Internet as a semicommons elegantly transforms the small-and-private 7. Id. at 131. 8. See Smith, supra note 6, at 145 (" [T] he open-field system is a mixture of common and private ownership, and the question is, why not one or the other?"); infra Part III.
9. See POST, supra note 1, at 80-86 (discussing layering); ZITTRAIN, supra note 2, at 67-69 ("Layers facilitate polyarchies . . . ."); infra Part IV.A.
10. See ZITTRAIN, supra note 2, at 142-43, 147-48 (discussing "netizenship" and "personal commitments" of Wikipedia editors); infra Part IV.B. See generally ANDREW DALBY, THE WORLD AND WIKIPEDIA: HOW WE ARE EDITING REALITY (2009) (describing the history and norms of Wikipedia in detail).
versus large-and-common antithesis into a compelling synthesis. Simultaneously treating network elements as private property and the "network" as a commons captures the distinctive benefits of both resource models. And in Part III.C I'll briefly describe how semicommons theory is implicit in Zittrain's argument.
In Part IV, I'll demonstrate the analytical power of this way of looking at the Internet-in particular, how it makes sense out of a wide range of technical and social institutions commonly seen online. Part IV.A will illustrate the importance of layering in enabling uses of the Internet at different scales to coexist. Part IV.B will discuss how user-generated content (UGC) sites solve semicommons governance problems. And Part IV.C will consider the role of boundary-setting in the failure of Usenet and the success of e-mail. Finally, in Part V, I'll briefly argue that semicommons theory usefully helps us focus on the interdependence between private and common, rather than seeing them as implacable opposites.
II. PROPERTY AND THE PROBLEM OF SCALE
David Post and Jonathan Zittrain both link the Internet's extraordinary growth to its extraordinary openness. You don't need to ask anyone's official permission to create a new community or a new application online. Result: more freedom and more innovation, enabling the Internet to outcompete proprietary, controlled networks. 11 But this openness, which draws on property-theoretic ideas about sustainable commons, comes with its own theoretical puzzle. Big things have a tendency to collapse under their own weight, and the Internet is nothing if not big. 12 The conventional wisdom in property circles is that a commons in any finite resource becomes increasingly untenable as its scale increases. 13 The intellectual "commons" that many intellectual property scholars celebrate escapes this trap because (and only because) information isn't used up when it's shared. 14 That tells us why writers and musicians and inventors and programmers can benefit from robust sharing and a rich public domain, but it doesn't seem to be directly relevant to the underlying question of why the Internet didn't flame out spectacularly several orders of magnitude ago, as users took advantage of its openness to use up its available capacity.
This part will articulate, in somewhat more detail, the nature of this theoretical tension between openness and size on the Internet. Part II.A will 11 . See POST, supra note 1, at 103 ("Perhaps it was a coincidence that the network that became 'the Internet' was the one that operated this way . . . . I doubt it, though."); ZITTRAIN, supra note 2, at 30 ("The bundled proprietary model . . . had been defeated by the Internet model . . . .").
12. See infra Part II.A. 13. See infra Part II.B. 14. See infra Part II.C.
"Aha!" moments about it. Post wants his readers to believe that it really is there, that it really is something new, and that it really does work. Just as Jefferson's moose was meant to impress visitors with its scale, the first half of Jefferson's Moose is meant to impress readers with the Internet's scale. This point bears emphasis. The Internet is sublimely large; in comparison with it, all other human activity is small. It has more than a billion users, 22 who've created over two hundred million websites 23 with more than a trillion different URLs, 24 and send over a hundred billion emails a day. 25 American Internet users consumed about ten exabytes of video and text in 2008-that's 10,000,000,000,000,000,000 bytes, give or take a few. 26 Watching all the videos uploaded to YouTube alone in a single day would be a full-time job-for fifteen years. 27 The numbers are incomprehensibly big, and so is the Internet. 28 These statistics tell us beyond peradventure that the Internet has been wildly successful, but they don't by themselves tell us why. Post's answer is that the Internet is built in a uniquely Jeffersonian way. Technologically, it depends on bottom-up, self-organized routing. 29 Its political and social structures, as well, are self-organized in a bottom-up fashion, with decisions made by local groups on the basis of consensus and voluntary association. 30 These features are also characteristic of Jefferson's ideal democratic republic, making the Internet the truest realization yet of his political vision. 31 People choose to go to the Internet for the same reasons Jefferson expected them to settle the American West: to build new lives and new communities for themselves on a firm foundation of liberty. 32 Zittrain's theory of the Internet's success is that it's a generative system, open to unfiltered contributions from anyone and everyone. 33 The Internet lets its users innovate and share their innovations with each other without being thwarted by gatekeepers who can veto proposed changes and system designers who can make change impossible in the first place. 34 This greater openness to unanticipated developments gives the Internet a powerful flexibility: it can draw on the best of what all its users have come up with. 35 Like Post's, this is a bottom-up story: these new protocols, technologies, and communities are being assembled by individuals, rather than being dictated from on high.
Property theory has a word for this form of resource management: commons. Post focuses on the self-assembly inherent in the Internet Protocol (IP) 36 and on self-governance, 37 while Zittrain focuses on technical innovation 38 and norm creation, 39 but these are very much the same story. The Internet's users are individually empowered to use the network as they see fit. There's no Internet Tycoon who owns the whole thing and can kick everyone else off; there's no Internet Czar who sets the rules for everyone else. That makes the Internet, on this view, a nearly ideal commons: a resource that everyone has a privilege to use and no one has a right to control.
So far, so good. But there's a reason that Post calls it the "problem" of scale. 40 Size is more than just proof of success; it also creates new and distinctive problems of its own. The biological metaphor is helpful. Following Haldane's classic On Being the Right Size, Post writes, "Large organisms are not and cannot be simply small organisms blown up to larger size." 41 A moose blown up by a factor of ten, to be seventy feet tall instead The same is true of computer networks: some architectures that work well with one hundred users fail embarrassingly with one million-or one billion. Post gives another back-of-the-envelope demonstration to show that a centrally operated Internet could not possibly have a strong enough skeleton 42 to support all of the communications between its billion-plus users. 43 Thus, the decentralization and ad hoc ethos that Post and Zittrain celebrate about the Internet are technological necessities. It took packet switching and distributed best-efforts routing to make a global network on the scale of the Internet feasible.
Property theory has its own problem of scale. If Buffon thought that nature made large New World wildlife impossible, and if political theorists thought human nature made large republics impossible, and if network engineers thought that physics made large decentralized networks impossible, then property theorists have long thought that large commons were self-defeating. 44 Anything held in common would be overused or underproduced, and the larger the relevant community, the more severe the problem. 45 As the Internet asymptotically approaches the whole of human experience, it would seem that its usability ought to be trending toward a limit of zero. The benefits of openness are clear, but so are the immense costs of wasteful and self-interested overuse. Since the Internet, like Jefferson's moose or the aerodynamically unlikely bumblebee that Zittrain uses as a metaphor for Wikipedia, 46 unarguably is, this success requires explanation. To find one, we will need to delve deeper into property theory.
completely socialized British Empire or United States than an elephant turning somersaults or a hippopotamus jumping a hedge."). Had Haldane been exposed to the Internet, he might have noted that it has an inordinate fondness for pictures of cats.
42. 
B. The Tragedy of the (Rival) Commons
In order to make sense of the Internet as a species of commons, we first need to situate the commons within property theory. Our starting point is the standard distinction between two kinds of resources: private goods and pure public goods. 47 Private goods such as cars, farms, and handbags have two key characteristics. First, they're rival: one person's use of the good makes it unavailable for someone else. Only one person at a time can carry a handbag or plant the same furrow. Second, they're excludable: it's possible to prevent people from using the good. We can hold tightly to handbags and put fences around farms. These distinctions are illustrated in the following, wholly conventional figure:
For rival goods, excludability has three salutary effects. First, it helps prevent wasteful underuse. If you own a resource but my proposed use is higher value than yours, it will be profitable for both of us for you to sell it to me. 48 Second, it prevents dissipation of the resource's value as we fight over it; without excludability I could simply take the resource from you and you could take it back, ad nauseam. Third, it promotes efficient investment: companies will invest in creating or improving resources if they can also reap the gains from the increase in value. 49 Things are trickier when excludability fails. Resources that are rival but not excludable are common goods (in the bottom-left quadrant of the diagram). Common goods are subject to a wasteful race that Garrett Hardin termed the "tragedy of the commons" in his influential 1968 article. 50 As he argued, Adding together the component partial utilities, the rational herdsman concludes that the only sensible course for him to pursue is to add another animal to his herd. And another; and another. . . . But this is the conclusion reached by each and every rational herdsman sharing a commons. Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit-in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all. 51 The tragedy flows from the lack of excludability. The herdsmen race to graze more sheep because no one can stop them, and they know that no one will stop the others. If excludability could be restored and the sheep could somehow be kept off the pasture, the race would be terminated before it got out of hand. 52 As Hardin put it, "the necessity of abandoning the commons" 53 would require "mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon" 54 to establish effective restrictions on overuse.
Hardin assumed that these restrictions could take one of two forms: "private property" or governmental "allocation." 55 A sole private owner absorbs the full costs and benefits of using the pasture and therefore will choose the right number of sheep to graze. 56 A government regulator, on the other hand, could allow multiple shepherds access, but limit the number of sheep each may graze so that the total comes out right. Either way, the key is to recreate excludability. 57 On our diagram, these are moves from the bottom-left quadrant to the top-left.
Henry Smith has generalized this dichotomy by recasting it as a division between two organizational forms: exclusion and governance. 58 Exclusion, which corresponds to private property, involves giving one designated gatekeeper complete control over the resource. 59 In a governance regime, on the other hand, multiple users are allowed to use the resource, but are subject to rules specifying how, when, and in what ways. 60 An exclusion regime puts a fence around the pasture and gives one person the key; a governance regime brands all the sheep and limits the number each person may graze.
The exclusion/governance distinction focuses on the institutional characteristics that matter, rather than on the formal label of "property" or "regulation." Exclusion and governance both depend on a source of authority to enforce the rules that recreate excludability. To use Hardin's term, "coercion" was essential. 61 But, as scholars of the commons have recognized, that coercion need not come from above, in the form of the state. 62 It could also come from below, from the other users of the resource themselves.
Elinor Ostrom's work shows that many communities have successfully managed common resources. 63 Her list of successes includes Spanish irrigation ditches, Japanese forests, and even Swiss grazing meadowsHardin's signature example of failure, turned on its head. These communities have created and then enforced on themselves a governance regime controlling use of their common resource. These bottom-up institutions are neither archaic holdovers nor illusory bulwarks; under the right circumstances, common ownership can thrive for hundreds of years.
It doesn't always work, though. Many common ownership regimes have succeeded, but many others have failed. 64 The question thus becomes, what distinguishes the commons that work from the ones that suffer Hardin's tragic fate? Ostrom and others give lists of the core factors that make a commons sustainable, including good institutions to gather information about the resource, forums to discuss its management, graduated sanctions to punish misusers, and community participation in making and enforcing the rules. 65 In this tradition, one factor stands out as essential to the success of a commons: community coherence. Mancur Olson's theory of collective action argues that small groups can better coordinate their actions than large ones. 66 Ostrom emphasizes the importance of well-defined boundaries, not just around the resource, but around the community too. 67 Robert Ellickson's study of Shasta County ranchers found their norm-based selfregulation worked because they formed a "close-knit group." 68 These communities can transform a commons into a common-pool resource: 69 they supplement their internal governance regime with exclusion towards 61 outsiders. 70 Only a small, well-defined, tightly knit group can recognize outsiders to keep them away, monitor and act against its own members with the necessary intensity, and have a sufficiently strong incentive to bother. Size, in other words, ought to be fatal to commons self-management. All else being equal, a small and coherent community is more likely to succeed at running a commons; a large and diffuse one is more likely to botch the job. The bigger the group, the greater the tendency towards ruin.
Let's call this strain of commons theory the Tragic story. Its basic lesson is Hardin's: commonly held resources are vulnerable to self-interested overuse. That fate can be staved off through a variety of arrangements, including private property, governmental regulation, or common selfmanagement. This last institutional form requires community members to craft their own rules of appropriate use, monitor each other's behavior, and punish violators. 71 This is a fragile enterprise; only strong and well-defined communities will be able to sustain the constant work of self-control required. Success requires closing the commons off to outsiders; to throw the community open to them is to court disaster.
This Tragic story has been frequently told about the Internet. Telecommunications analysts predict an impending bandwidth crunch, as users deplete the limited supply of available connectivity. 72 Telecommunications companies complain that selfish bandwidth hogs are destroying the Internet experience for other customers. 73 Scholars warn that weak incentives to cooperate make Wikipedia unsustainable 74 -or perhaps online sharing more generally is doomed. 75 The Tragic story 70 . This arrangement is also described in the literature as a "limited-access commons," see, e.g., Smith, supra note 58, at S458, or "limited common property," see, e.g., Carol M. explains skepticism about YouTube's business model 76 and fears about the rise of malware, botnets, and denial-of-service attacks. 77 If, as the Tragic story predicts, bigger means riskier, then the immense Internet ought to be an immense smoking ruin. Peer-to-peer file sharing and video downloads always look poised to overwhelm capacity in a host of I-want-mine overuse. Just as soon as a few more people crank up their usage, or one really clever bad apple figures out how to use it all up, it'll be the endgame for the Internet. As of this writing though, the Internet still stands, the Tragic story notwithstanding. To make sense of why that might be, let's return to commons theory-another strand of which has come to almost exactly the opposite conclusion.
C. The Comedy of the (Nonrival) Commons
So far, we've been discussing rival resources, in the left-hand column of the diagram. Here, to repeat, the traditional economic view is that efficiency flows from excludability; commons theory accepts that view but offers a different, bottom-up way of creating exclusivity. Now, let's turn to the right-hand column, where nonrival resources dwell. Once again, traditional economic theory prizes excludability, albeit with considerably less certitude than for rival resources. But this time, commons theory takes an altogether more radical turn-arguing that exclusivity itself is overrated.
The starting point of the analysis is that many nonrival goods can be shared with others for much less than it costs to make them in the first place. Information in digital form, for example, can be copied and transmitted around the world for almost nothing. But even tangible goods can often be shared without imposing costs on current users: at 2:00 a.m., a second car on the road doesn't limit the first driver ' To be more precise, as Brett Frischmann explains, goods vary in their capacity to accommodate multiple uses. But even a good with a finite capacity can still be effectively nonrivalrous if that capacity is also renewable. Id. at 950-56. A stretch of highway may be able to accommodate 2000 cars per hour, but its use at 6:00 a.m. has essentially no effect on its ability to accommodate cars at 6:00 p.m. As long as we're beneath the level of use at which adding cars would create a traffic jam now, the highway is nonrival. Yochai Benkler has developed this point into a theory of "sharable" goods. Where the nonrival resource is also nonexcludable, and thus a pure public good, this is a problem. As soon as the seller has created the goodsay, a photograph of a sheep-everyone else can have access to it for free; only suckers and patsies would pay for it if they didn't have to. But that leaves the photographer with no economic incentive to go out and spend days taking the perfect photograph, so she won't create it in the first place, which leaves no original for others to copy. Result: everyone loses. 79 The conventional response here has been to focus on making the resource more excludable. 80 This is the usual economic apology for granting a photographer copyright over her photographs, for example. 81 It allows her to prevent the nonrival sharing that would otherwise flood the market with cheap copies and undercut her ability to recoup her costs. 82 The same logic also explains various self-help substitutes for intellectual property, such as end-user license agreements and digital rights management (DRM): they all recreate excludability. 83 If she can move all the way up the right-hand column and make the resource perfectly excludable, then she can capture the full social value of her work, giving her an efficient incentive for the optimal level of creativity. 84 In this respect, at least, full excludability makes public nonrival goods look like private rival goods. 85 But excludability's prevention of free riding is not a free lunch. For one thing, it's expensive to establish: IP laws have to be enforced, licenses have to be drafted, and DRM has to be programmed. 86 For another, excludability can be harmful in itself. Even though the good (being nonrival) could be shared freely or cheaply, a rational owner will instead price it to maximize her profits. But that means she'll sell it for more than some people would 84. See Demsetz, supra note 49, at 300-03 (arguing that the resulting equilibrium "allocates resources efficiently to the production of the public good").
85. There are, however, other important ways in which they differ. Because these nonrival goods have high fixed (or first-copy) costs but very low marginal costs, there's an enormous competitive advantage to being the bigger competitor in a market. Your average costs will be lower than your competitors, helping you undercut their prices and seize the whole of the market. This gives these markets-one kind of "network industry"-distinctive economics and creates special managerial and regulatory challenges. have been willing to pay; 87 the good ends up being used less than would have been socially efficient. 88 Thus, the conventional economic narrative of intellectual property law is of a dialectic pitting her ex ante incentives to create the information good against the ex post value of broad access to it. 89 Whatever balance we choose is likely to impose costs on both sides.
Scholars have therefore looked for ways to avoid the difficulties of finding market incentives to create public goods. One approach is right there in the name: the government could directly invest in these "public" goods. That's the conventional way of paying for physical public goods, like lighthouses. 90 At times, governmental investment has also been used to pay for information goods, such as the NEA's grants to artists and prizes for scientific discoveries. 91 Once government funding succeeds in bringing these goods into existence, they can be given away freely. Voilà: no costs from imposing excludability. 92 Commons theory takes this idea-maximal circulation of information goods at no cost-and runs with it. The key move is the recognition that solving the ex post distribution problem can also, paradoxically, help solve the ex ante production problem. 93 Making information more widely available doesn't just benefit passive couch-potato information consumers;
87. In a world in which she cannot price discriminate perfectly and costlessly, that is. If she could, perfect price discrimination would also in theory lead to an efficient outcome, one in which she appropriates all the value of the good, rather than other users. 92. On the other hand, having the government pay for it doesn't solve the problem of deciding how much to pay for it. Here, it's even more difficult to decide how much the government should spend for the sheep photograph. Since the photograph will ultimately be given away for free, the government will find it well-nigh impossible to learn how much each individual would have been willing to pay for it. See Paul A. it also helps other information producers. 94 Information goods are critical inputs into the production of other information goods, so increasing their circulation gives creators more to work with. Information is the oxygen of the mind; lowering the cost of air lets minds breathe more freely. 95 All creativity is influenced and inspired by what has come before; all innovation incrementally builds on past inventions. The public domain is not simply a negative space of the unprotected, but a positive resource of immense richness available to all. 96 On this account, reducing the excludability of nonrival information goods will often lead to more information production, not less, because the reduced incentives for creators will be more than outweighed by the increased access to raw materials. 97 In a further twist, scholars of the information commons have argued that often we don't need any external incentives for the production of information goods. 98 In these cases, we can dispense with excludability completely. Some people take photographs of sheep because they want the pictures for themselves; others want to express a vision of pastoral serenity; still others want to hone their skills with a camera, or to show off those skills to potential employers. This diversity of motivations means that even though the vast majority of photographers in the world are unpaid, they're still enthusiastically snapping pictures. Steven Weber's studies of open source software and Yochai Benkler's theory of peer production emphasize that personal expression, generosity, reciprocity, desire to show off, and other purely social motivations can be just as strong as economic ones. 99 94. Indeed, one of the other virtues of commons theory is its willingness to recognize that "consumers" and "producers" are often the exact same people, that individuals move between these roles seamlessly in their cultural, social, and intellectual lives. When they think about the ideal scale of an information commons, these thinkers generally say, "the more the merrier." 100 There are network effects from increased participation; the more people who are sharing with you, the greater the riches available for you to draw on. They don't cost you anything; indeed they may actively help out your own creative processes, for example by pointing out bugs in your open-source software. 101 If the community is engaged in cooking up a batch of informational stone soup, the larger the community grows, the richer the soup becomes, and the less of a burden the cooking places on any individual member. 102 Moreover, as Benkler argues, increased community scale leads to more opportunities for productive collaboration, so that sharing catalyzes creativity and vice-versa, accelerating the virtuous circle. 103 Let's call this strain of commons theory the "Comedic" story. 104 It applies to nonrival resources, and particularly to information goods. To review, its basic argument is that repudiating excludability is often better than embracing it. Since the resources are nonrival, free riding poses no threat of waste. Instead, a commons ensures the maximum possible use of valuable information, avoiding the waste associated with exclusive rights. The incentives to produce and share come from the internal and social motivations of participants, motivations that under the right circumstances may even be supplied by the commons itself.
Like its doppelgänger, the Comedic story has also frequently been told about the Internet. 105 The blogosphere, built on an ethos of sharing one's own thoughts and linking to others', is numerically dominated by noncommercial blogs written for personal reasons; even bloggers who make money selling ads still give the actual words away. 106 The last half-decade on the Web has been the great era of UGC sites like YouTube, Flickr, Facebook, and Twitter-all of which offer users access to content uploaded, for unpaid sharing, by other users. There's also a strong argument that many of these sharing-based sites are successfully outcompeting their more restricted competitors. Wikipedia's outrageous success, as compared with Nupedia, Citizendium, Knol, Encarta, and every other would-be online encyclopedia, could reasonably be attributed to its extraordinary openness to unfiltered contributions from anyone. 108 And on a deeper level, one noted by both Post 109 and Zittrain, 110 the Internet is itself largely built with nonproprietary technical standards, free for anyone to reuse and implement for themselves. 111 Even when private companies develop and commercialize services, they've thrived best when the companies have released well-documented public interfaces, free for anyone to use and build upon in making new mashup applications. 112 Even much of the software on which the Internet itself runs is the freely shared product of collaborative open-source development, carried out collaboratively worldwide . . . on the Internet. 113 III. THE SEMICOMMONS It should by now be clear that the Tragic and Comedic stories point in diametrically opposite directions. The Tragic story embraces exclusion; it tells us that the only way to make a commons work is to make it small and jealously keep outsiders out. 114 The Comedic story rejects exclusion; it tells us that the best way to make a commons thrive is to make it large and invite in as many participants as possible. 115 As applied to the immensity of the Internet, the Comedic story predicts utopia and the Tragic story predicts utter devastation. The Internet's success at scale suggests that there must be something to the Comedic story's optimism, but so far, we have no good theoretical they create things for one another's pleasure and to conquer their uneasy sense of being too alone.").
108. In a semicommons, a resource is owned and used in common for one major purpose, but, with respect to some other major purpose, individual economic units-individuals, families, or firms-have property rights to separate pieces of the commons. Most property mixes elements of common and private ownership, but one or the other dominates. . . . In what I am calling a semicommons, both common and private uses are important and impact significantly on each other. 116 On Smith's account, a resource must satisfy two conditions to be a good candidate for semicommons ownership. There must be multiple possible uses of the resource that are efficient at different scales, so that one use is naturally private, and one is naturally common. These uses must also have significant positive interactions with each other, so that there will be a benefit from allowing both rather than choosing one. The combination of scale mismatch and positive interactions offers rewards for mixing private and common. 117 Smith's "archetypal example of a semicommons is the open-field system of medieval [Europe] ." 118 Sheep could be grazed freely across the fields of a village during fallow seasons, but during growing seasons, individual farmers had exclusive rights to their strips of land. The same fields were held in common for grazing and privately for farming: a semicommons. As he shows, the open-field system displayed both scale mismatch and positive interactions. 119 First, the two valuable uses of its land-grazing sheep and raising crops-were efficient at different scales. Medieval grazing had scale economies: one shepherd could watch a large flock on a correspondingly large pasture. 120 quantity of land. Nor was there much benefit in teaming up; two men couldn't plow the same furrow, and combining holdings would have tempted each farmer to shoulder less than his share of the work. 121 Thus, grazing made sense as a commons in which each villager was entitled to contribute sheep to a large flock grazed across large tracts of land. This is a natural governance regime: the extent of each villager's use could easily be monitored by counting his sheep. On the other hand, farming made sense as private property in which each villager farmed his own small plot of land. This is a natural exclusion regime: it's easy to tell who's harvesting from which piece of land. 122 As for positive interactions, the same land could profitably be used for both farming and grazing. Land needs to sit fallow between growing seasons; 123 a village might as well graze sheep during the off-season. 124 Better still, the best source of fertilizer for the fields was the manure left behind by the sheep. 125 Thus, the private plots of land worked better for their private purpose because they were also open to the common use of grazing sheep.
In addition to explaining why a semicommons might come into being, Smith's theory also explains some of the distinctive threats it will face from strategic behavior. 126 I'd like to emphasize three. First, in a semicommons, users will be tempted not just to overuse the common resource, but to strategically dump the costs onto others' private portions, bearing none of the costs themselves. 127 On a rainy day, when trampling hooves will do the most damage and create the most mud, a shepherd might be tempted to direct the herd onto someone else's plot of land and well away from his own. 128 Second, users may be tempted to take expensive and socially wasteful precautions to guard against others' strategic uses-say, sitting outside all day in the rain to watch the shepherd. 129 And third, private users will be tempted to disregard the commons use in pursuit of their private gain; 130 imagine a farmer who decides to plant a profitable crop that's poisonous to sheep. The semicommons only makes sense if the benefits from combining the private and common uses outweigh the costs from these kinds of strategic behavior. 131 Semicommons also have important strategies for dealing with these challenges. One is sharing rules, in which some of the private portions of the resource are collected and divided among the various users. 132 Smith gives the example of general average in admiralty, in which all those with an interest in a ship or its cargo must contribute proportionately to reimburse anyone whose property is damaged in the course of avoiding a common peril. 133 That eliminates the captain's temptation to throw other people's cargo overboard first. In our hypothetical village, pooling some of the crops after each season would be a sharing rule protecting victims of excessive trampling.
Another characteristic semicommons device is boundary-setting. 134 Smith's example here is scattering; each villager's landholdings were divided into multiple small strips in different fields, rather than one larger plot. 135 Scattering was costly; farmers sometimes got confused about which strip was theirs. 136 But it also made abusive herding less attractive. With many thin strips, it's harder for the shepherd to park the sheep over his own plot while they poop, and over someone else's plot while they stomp. Getting the property boundaries right thus helps prevent strategic behavior.
B. The Internet Semicommons
Smith's semicommons model accurately describes the Internet. We'll see every element of it online: private and common uses of the same resource, efficient at wildly different scales, but productively intertwined; strategic behavior that also causes these uses to undermine each other; 137 sharing rules and boundary-setting to keep the whole thing functioning. 138 The productive but fraught interplay between private and common uses in a semicommons elegantly captures the tension between the Tragic and Comedic stories on the Internet.
Let's start with the private and common uses. On the one hand, the computers and network cables that actually make up the Internet are private personal property, managed via exclusion. My laptop is mine and mine alone. If I decide to laser-etch its case, or to wipe it clean and reinstall the operating system, no one can stop me. Nor can anyone else decide what outlet it's plugged into; if you try to treat it as common property and take it home with you, you'll be brought up on charges. The same goes for Rackspace's servers 139 ) ("In a managed hosting environment, the provider owns the data centers, the network, the server and other devices, and is responsible for deploying, maintaining and monitoring On the other hand, as a communications platform, 141 the Internet is remarkably close to a commons, managed via governance in the form of technical standards and protocols. 142 Fill out an IP datagram with the 32-bit IP address of a computer you'd like to send a message to, and dozens of routers will cheerfully cooperate to get it there. 143 The destination computer has also likely been configured to collaborate with you. Send it an HTTP GET message and you'll get back a Web page; 144 send it an SMTP HELO and it will get ready to accept an e-mail from you. 145 With this kind of support-yours for the asking-you and your friends can set up a new website, a new online application, a new protocol, a new peer-to-peer network, a new whatever you want. That's common use of a fairly profound sort-precisely as Post and Zittrain describe. 146 Next, these private and common uses are efficient at different scales. Private property makes sense for individual computers and cables; the them. . . . Dedicated Hosting . . . allows customers to lease pre-configured, dedicated equipment and connectivity from the provider.").
140. See Level3, Our Network, http://www.level3.com/index.cfm?pageID=242 (last visited Apr. 10, 2010) ("The Level 3 Communications® Network today operates as one of the largest IP transit networks in North America and Europe.").
141. To be clear, I'm focusing more on tangible communications platform as a common use, rather than the intangible information exchanged on it. The nonrivalry of information and the Comedic story explain why the Internet is so valuable as a communications platform; they don't actually make the Internet into information or eliminate the challenges of rivalry. We've faced the problem of exchanging nonrival information over rival communications infrastructure for a long time; the Internet is just better at the task than its predecessors. See generally Frischmann, supra note 78, at 1005-22 (describing the Internet as infrastructure). Robert Heverly has written an important and illuminating article on how intellectual property law makes information a semicommons of positively interacting private and common uses. Robert A. Heverly Tragic story warns us to restrict access. 147 Computers are rival: they can be stolen, hijacked, or crashed. Hardware remains expensive enough that people will try to get their hands on it (physically or virtually), and when they succeed, it creates real costs for others. 148 Private property empowers individual owners to protect against laptop thieves, virus writers, and botnet wranglers. 149 Moreover, private use of computers aligns incentives well. Computers require their owners to invest time, effort, and money: buying the hardware, setting up the software, keeping the power and bandwidth flowing. An exclusion regime both allows and encourages computer owners to select the configuration that's value-maximizing for them. I use my laptop to write papers, check e-mail, and surf the Web wirelessly; you use your broadband-connected desktop to run regressions and play World of Warcraft. Our ideal computers are profoundly different; asking us to play sysadmin for each other would only pile up the agency costs. All of this pushes towards small-scale private ownership.
On the other hand, commons use makes sense when we look at the Internet as a communications platform. The Comedic story tells us that where information exchange is concerned, we should design for the widest participation possible. A communications network's value plummets if it's fragmented. 150 If you have something to say to even one other person, you may as well post it publicly, so that anyone else can take advantage of it. When you do, better to share with the world than with any smaller group. 151 Further, this large-scale communications platform wouldn't work efficiently if it were private. Scholars have noted the immense transaction 147 151. Lauren Gelman observes that users often post sensitive information in publicly accessible ways online. Her point is that public accessibility allows you to reach others who share your interests, even when you couldn't identify them at the time of the posting. costs of negotiating individual permission from every system owner, 152 along with the potential anticommons holdup problems. 153 It's almost a mantra at this point that if you want to create a successful online service, you need to make it free and freely available. 154 And even as ISPs threaten to introduce stringent usage caps, they can barely manage to tell customers how much bandwidth they're actually using. 155 The commons has a powerful hold on the Internet as communications platform.
In other words, the Tragic story is right, for the individual computers and wires that constitute the Internet. It recommends private property, which is indeed how these physical resources are held. And the Comedic story is also right, for those computers and wires considered as the communications platform that is the Internet. It recommends an unmanaged commons, which is indeed how this virtual resource is held.
Not only are both stories right, they're right at wildly different scales. Remember how there are over a billion users and over two hundred million websites on the Internet? 156 That's a difference of eight or nine orders of magnitude between the scale of the individual computers on which private owners operate and the scale of the worldwide common platform. That divergence isn't a one-time anomaly; it's what the Internet does, every millisecond of every day, everywhere in the world. Satisfying Smith's other condition, these two uses "impact . . . on each other" 157 profoundly and positively. You couldn't build a common global network without the private infrastructure to run it on, but most of the value of that infrastructure comes from the common global network dancing atop it. To see why it's the interaction that adds the value, remember that the private owners could disconnect their computers from the semicommons at any moment-and choose not to. Would you buy a computer incapable of being connected to the Internet? Neither would I. This is a semicommons that works.
Indeed, the Internet is probably the greatest, purest semicommons in history.
152. Paul Ohm has pointed out that in many cases, just trying to meter or monitor these information flows-a necessary step in privatizing them-would in many circumstances be ruinously costly. 
C. The Generative Semicommons
In a moment, we'll complete this portrait of the Internet semicommons by looking at its characteristic forms of strategic behavior. But first, I'd like to point out how semicommons theory offers a fresh perspective on generativity. The Future of the Internet describes the generativity of both the personal computer (PC) 158 and the Internet, 159 which map neatly onto the private and common aspects of the Internet.
A generative PC is one that its owner fully controls. Not a tethered appliance that's physically yours but practically under someone else's governance. 160 Not a cloud service that you might be excluded from tomorrow. 161 And not an insecure box actually under the control of a shadowy Elbonian hacker syndicate. No, the generative PC is your private property, yours to do with exactly as you choose.
The generative Internet, on the other hand, is defined by its connectedness and commonality. Once you have a great new hack, the best thing to do is to send it out to others, so they can replicate its benefits for themselves and build their own improvements on it. That means the network ought to be as common as possible; you should be able to share your innovations with anyone, not subject to any third party's veto. Although Zittrain rejects a "categorical" end-to-end principle, 162 he treasures the way that the Internet's lack of control permits a "flexible, robust platform for innovation." 163 The two stages of generativity-creating and sharing-thus map onto private and common, respectively. The cycle works best when the two are not just available, but conjoined. Generativity is the story of the Internet as innovating semicommons.
IV. CHALLENGES
As a semicommons, the Internet is valuable because it combines private and commons uses. Merely saying that it does, however, gives little guidance on how to make this coexistence work. Indeed, one of Smith's central points is that problems of strategic behavior are actually worse in a semicommons than in a pure commons. 164 His account of the open-field system doesn't just explain why it might make sense to treat the village fields as a semicommons; it also describes how villagers were able to solve these strategic behavior problems. 165 In so doing, he also provides a 166 This part will do the same for the Internet: link the theoretical question of the mitigation of strategic behavior in a semicommons to well-known descriptive characteristics of the Internet. I'll argue that the success of many Internet technical features and online institutions can be cleanly explained in terms of their ability to overcome semicommons dilemmas. Part IV.A discusses "layering," one of the Internet's basic technical characteristics, in which one protocol provides a clean abstraction atop which another can run, and so on repeatedly. Layering helps mediate the private/common interface and helps prevent these uses from interfering with each other. Part IV.B takes up UGC sites, which exhibit a consistent correlation between a community and a particular piece of infrastructure. This linkage enables them to use governance rather than exclusion to detect and prevent misuse of their little corner of the Internet. And Part IV.C looks at some problems of boundary-setting, in particular how the Usenet system of distributed bulletin boards has failed to cope with strategic behavior. Its experience tells us much about the challenges of institution design on the Internet.
A. Layering
The term "layering" comes from computer science, where it describes the division of a system into components, each of which only interacts with the ones immediately "above" or "below" it. 167 Programmers and system designers use layered architectures because they enable modularity: each component can be designed without needing to know how the others work, which reduces the complexity of the programming task and simplifies debugging by reducing interactions between components. 168 On the Internet, layering is prevalent. When one user writes another an e-mail, the actual exchange typically involves six or more layers. The email ("content" layer) is sent from one e-mail program to another ("application" layer) using the Simple Mail Transport Protocol (another application, but one operating at the service of e-mail programs), which uses the Transmission Control Protocol to open a stable connection from one computer to the other ("transport" layer). That connection, in turn, is 166 . Smith, supra note 6, at 146-54 (arguing that border-setting semicommons explanation of scattering is superior to other economic explanations). made up of a sequence of discrete IP datagrams ("network" layer), which in turn are moved from one computer to the other using a network protocol such as Ethernet ("link" layer) that is tailored to run well on specific hardware like a Category 5e twisted-pair copper cable ("physical" layer). The e-mail program doesn't need to know how Ethernet works, and viceversa. 169 For our purposes, one layer is more equal than the others: the network layer, where IP is universal. 170 Lower layers have a diversity of networking protocols and hardware; higher layers have a diversity of transports and applications. But there is only one network-layer protocol worthy of note on the Internet: IP. 171 Everyone uses it. The Internet itself can be defined as the global network of computers using IP to communicate with each other. 172 As legal scholars have recognized, layering has policy implications. 173 In particular, it permits different resource allocation regimes at different layers. The same network may be fully private at the physical layer (only the company IT manager can enter the room with the server), a limitedaccess common-pool resource at the link layer (only employees in the building can connect to it, but they can do so freely), a governed open-tothe-world common-pool resource at the application layer (the company allows outside e-mail connections but filters them for spam), and mixed commons and private at the content layer (outside users send the employees both proprietary company documents and freely shared jokes). These different regimes coexist: the same physical network is simultaneously participating in all of them. 174 Any given electrical signal is meaningful at multiple layers.
169. See TANENBAUM, supra note 167, at 37-71. 170. To be more precise, this claim would also include the ancillary routing protocols, such as the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) and the Routing Information Protocol (RIP), that tell IP-implementing systems which other computers they should forward IP traffic through. See COMER, supra note 143, at 249-93 (describing BGP and RIP).
171. The current version of IP in broad use is version 4; there is a worldwide effort underway to upgrade to version 6. But IP's universality makes this upgrade both technically challenging and politically contentious: any widely adopted change to IP will change the nature of the Internet itself. IP plays a critical role in this system of overlapping regimes; it is the layer on which the Internet is most fully a commons. Beneath are privately owned hardware, managed networks, and (sometimes) proprietary protocols. Above it are specialized protocols that form direct connections between individual computers, tightly controlled applications, and copyrighted content. But IP itself is wide open: specify the IP address of a system you'd like your datagram to be delivered to, and dozens of computers along the way will voluntarily help get it there. Most of the time, no one asks for payment; no one inspects the contents; no one asks to see your signed authorization. This makes IP not just a universal layer sandwiched between more fragmented ones, 175 but also a commons layer sandwiched between more private ones.
It was an inspired design decision; IP has a lot of nice desiderata for a commons. A Comedic commons should be as large as possible, as easy as possible to join, as minimally demanding as possible on its participants, and as flexible as possible in the uses to which it can be put. IP checks every one of those boxes. Not only is it universal in the sense of being widely used, it's also universal in the sense of being able to run on any kind of network. 176 It's also a remarkably simple protocol; all it does is move datagrams from point A to point B. 177 That makes it easier to implement and reduces the need for explicit coordination, both factors that make it easier to participate in the IP commons. 178 Because IP's simplicity also precludes specialization for particular uses, it's suitable for almost every use. 179 It can be a jack of all trades by being a master of none. 180 The IP Internet is thus both easy for private infrastructure owners to join and easy for them to use profitably once they've joined.
This leaves, however, the problem of strategic behavior identified by Smith. That the Internet has a billion users is a sign of success, but that it has hundreds of millions of computers is a sign of challenge-that's a massive amount of resources to be devoting to the Internet semicommons. Every use of the IP commons imposes very real costs on the private infrastructure beneath it, and the natural question is why those costs don't 175. See ZITTRAIN, supra note 2, at 67-71 (discussing "hourglass architecture" of IP This isn't merely a theoretical concern. Strategic behavior is everywhere in the Internet semicommons. Network backbone operators routinely route packets in ways designed to dump as much of the cost as possible on each other. 181 Virus, worm, and malware authors use the commons to deliver their malicious software, hijack users' private computers, and send out spam-which in turn puts costs on private mail servers and actually degrades the content commons by polluting it with unwanted, distracting messages. 182 We also see the wasteful precautionary costs identified by Smith: spam filters, 183 CAPTCHAs, 184 firewalls, 185 and so on are the Internet equivalents of farmers sitting out in the rain watching to see where the sheep are driven. This is all rather discouraging, but, as Galileo apocryphally said, eppur si muove. 186 The Internet does work, fortunes are made on it, and millions of afternoons are enjoyably frittered away reading Twilight fan fiction. The benefits from combining private and common uses online must outweigh the costs, notwithstanding all of these abuses, or the Internet would not exist.
Layering is one reason that the costs of strategic behavior and fencing are manageable.
IP's simplicity creates a kind of forced sharing of 182. See ZITTRAIN, supra note 2, at 36-51. Of course, we might classify these contentlevel costs as burdens on the private resources of users' attention, but saying that this is a cost imposed on the commons, even if less descriptively precise, is clearer in terms of pinpointing the problem. 185. See WILLIAM R. CHESWICK ET AL., FIREWALLS AND INTERNET SECURITY: REPELLING THE WILY HACKER, at xviii (2d ed. 2003) (defining "firewall gateway" as a dedicated computer that is the only one on a network to communicate with the outside world); id. at 173-96 (describing how firewalls can provide specialized security). It's costly to add a dedicated computer to a network for no other purpose than security-to say nothing of the expense of configuring and monitoring it, or buying books like Firewalls and Internet Security. infrastructure for users. A former housemate used to saturate our Internet connection running a peer-to-peer Gnutella node. It brought my Web surfing to a crawl-but it also brought his Web surfing to a crawl. There was no way for him to reach down further in the protocol stack and prioritize his physical computer over mine. It wasn't full internalization of the costs he was creating for the rest of us-but it was enough to convince him to moderate his file sharing once he figured out the connection.
Layering also has salutary boundary-setting effects. 187 Because the IP layer hides those beneath it, it functions like scattering in preventing commons users from strategically targeting specific private pieces of infrastructure. It's impossible to know with certainty the path that a packet will follow, and if one link fails under overload, the packets will flow along another route. You can graze your traffic across particular networks, but you can't easily park all of it in one spot. Conversely, John Gilmore's quip that "[t]he Internet interprets censorship as damage and routes around it" 188 captures the point that it's difficult to impinge on commons uses by targeting specific pieces of the private infrastructure. Take out one node and the Internet's overall flows will be largely unaffected.
Looking upwards in the protocol stack rather than down, as long as my ISP and other infrastructure providers implement IP without violating its layering abstractions-that is, as long as they don't "look inside" the IP packets-they have almost no choice but to provide a "neutral" network. 189 Layering becomes an architectural constraint that prevents them from selectively choosing to block, alter, or slow my communications. That limits the power of these private owners to engage in self-interested bargaining with commons users; they can't go to Google and demand a premium for allowing its traffic to pass, or slow down all video content, or otherwise start tinkering with commons uses. 190 
B. User-Generated Content Sites
Next, consider a large and important category of Internet activity: UGC sites. All of these sites face the Internet's semicommons problem in miniature. They typically run on private infrastructure supplied by a single entity, but anyone in the world can view and contribute to them. 191 190. This is not to enter the debates on network neutrality as a matter of policy. My point is merely that layering as a form of boundary-setting limits certain forms of self-interested behavior by private owners; evaluating whether this is a good thing or a bad thing would require more analysis than can fit in this margin.
191. This is another layered system, but note that the private/common division is different than the one discussed in the previous section. Here, the system is held in common at the content layer, but is essentially private at every lower layer. are tiny, like my blog-laboratorium.net-which runs on a server operated by a group of my friends and has a few comments per day. 192 Others are gigantic, like YouTube, which runs on a massive Google server farm and serves up over a billion video views daily. 193 Once more, we wouldn't observe the semicommons form unless it were worthwhile. If the juxtaposition of private and common uses weren't creating value, then either the private owners of the servers would turn them off or the common users would stop participating. 194 In view of Smith's analysis of semicommons incentives, we should therefore ask how these sites produce value and how they keep costs under control.
The first answer is that on the Web, normal commons use can often be a source of value for server owners rather than a net cost. Consider my blog, for which I pay about $250 a year. Each pageview and comment costs me something, true, but it gives me more in return. By allowing readers to access my blog, I spread my ideas to a larger audience. By allowing comments, I learn from them. Even server owners motivated only by money can reap value from free commons use. The secret, as the first commercial bloggers discovered, is advertising. 195 More users mean more ad revenue, so that users are like pooping sheep: well worth the bother. 196 A site that is free to its users can take advantage of powerful Comedic effects. Any nonzero price requires some form of signup, login, and billing; in addition to being costly to implement, these exclusion mechanisms are 194. In this respect, these particular Internet semicommons are more susceptible to Demsetzian explanations than many offline property systems and legal regimes, where the problem of collective action looms larger. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. PROC. 347 (1967) (describing evolution of property rights as efficient response when value from more intensive use increases). Scholars, however, have raised difficult questions about the mechanism by which this evolution would take place. See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Two Stories About the Evolution of Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S421, S425-33 (2002) (noting ambiguity between optimistic Demsetzian story of the evolution of efficient property regimes and pessimistic story about selfish interest groups capturing value for themselves). A UGC site, however, as a resource, doesn't preexist the semicommons form (so that its users can hardly be accused of appropriating a commons for their exclusive use), and its users make individual voluntary decisions to take part when the rewards outweigh the costs (thus providing a straightforward mechanism for the collective decision to use a particular governance regime). This isn't to say that UGC sites are free of interest-group dynamics, or that they don't face collective action dilemmas, only that their initial development of a property system may pose less of a puzzle than the development of property systems in purely tangible online resources.
195. See ROSENBERG, supra note 106, at 178-85. 196. Sometimes, as with Twitter, the ad revenue isn't there yet (and may not ever be, if the skeptics are to be believed), but the prospect of monetizing the eyeballs justifies the upfront expenses of building the community. surprisingly strong psychological impediments to participation. 197 That means a huge, discontinuous jump in usage when access is truly open. On a site where users interact with each other in creative ways, this spike in usage has powerful feedback effects. My commenters don't just respond to me; they also riff on each others' thoughts. It is, in short, the Comedic story all over again: creating a community of sharers produces value for everyone involved.
The second piece of the puzzle is that the server owner doesn't disappear from the picture entirely. She retains residual exclusionary power. 198 She may not exercise it ex ante, at least in the first instance. But she can and regularly does exercise it ex post, to target specific instances of abuse. If YouTube users flag an inappropriate video, YouTube will yank it. 199 If I see a spam comment on my blog, I delete it. If the abuses are flagrant enough, the user is likely to be kicked off the site entirely-and eventually, to be blocked at the IP address level. 200 In other words, YouTube and I are paying the monitoring costs to watch what commons users do on our private pieces of the Web. We're using governance to control behavior and self-help exclusion to enforce our decisions. The openness of our sites creates a classically Tragic scenario; we use our platform power to deter misuse. 201 We're willing to pay these costs because the overall benefits to us of common usage are larger still. ) (discussing role played by amateur "sysops" of online forums, newsgroups, and bulletin boards in fostering community). Zittrain's message in 1997 was pessimistic; he saw the sysop as a dying breed presiding over fragile communities. The Future of the Internet is far more optimistic about the potential of bottom-up collaboration and altruistic community creation in creating a healthy online society. One possible difference between then and now, I would submit, is that the benefits of linking these communities together on the Internet-putting the "commons" in "semicommons"-are much clearer today. Zittrain's invocation of the "sysop" also leads us off into the world of bulletin-board systems (or "BBSes"). Time and space constraints don't permit me to discuss them in detail as an additional example of an online organizational form. Their basic model, however-privately owned servers, connected to the telephone network, accessible to anyone who wished to dial in via modem-fits the basic semicommons pattern described in this essay, and their history also illustrates the applicability of Smith's model. The fact that we have this residual platform-based power and are willing to use it creates its own countervailing dangers of strategic behavior. I could delete comments from people who disagree with me. YouTube could make it impossible for users to get their videos off the site. These are private uses that impose costs on the common uses, and they're well studied in the literature (if not usually in these terms). 202 Abating these costs is itself a question in institution design.
But note that within the semicommons framework we can still describe the problem as overall cost minimization across a number of different forms of strategic behavior and strategic behavior prevention.
A third critical point about these sites is that their success depends on their users. A coherent and motivated user can collectively exercise governance to prevent abuse. Some users guard the private infrastructure from commons overuse. Craigslist knows which posts are spam because its users tell it. 203 Other users defend the commons from its own enemies. Wikipedia's first line of defense against lies and propaganda is eagle-eyed users who look for self-interested or bad-faith edits and undo them. 204 A strong user community can even defend the commons from the private infrastructure owner, as Facebook discovered when it tried to introduce privacy-invading advertising technologies. 205 Scale matters in this story. The Tragic story reminds us that smaller groups will be better at self-monitoring and enforcement. And that's exactly what we see on the Internet, after a fashion. "The Internet" as a whole doesn't have a generic "flag this content for removal" button. Instead, the pruning and weeding that help UGC sites flourish take place on those sites. The division of the Web into distinct "sites" makes it easier for close-knit communities to form.
These local communities, in turn, are coupled to each other in important ways. 206 quotation, and conversation. 207 YouTube took off because it offered users the trivially easy capacity to embed videos in other Web pages-that is, to bridge the YouTube community and others. 208 This is a modular structure: tight community coupling within a site and looser coupling across sites. 209 This arrangement makes each site's Tragic internal governance problem more manageable while also facilitating Comedic conversations across sites. 210 The same is also true within large sites. Wikipedia has many "WikiProjects": groups of pages on a similar topic. 211 They tend to have common groups of editors who focus on them. Bingo: a small and closeknit community, loosely coupled to others within Wikipedia. Similarly, social network sites divide the world into small networks centered around every user, forming overlapping communities. These Internet institutions bridge the optimal scales for private and common uses.
C. Usenet and Boundary-Setting
Semicommons theory explains the Internet's failures as well as its successes. Only those online institutions that can cost-effectively deter strategic behavior at the interface between private and common will prosper at the planetary scale of the Internet. Those that can't will stagnate rather than grow-or even collapse entirely under the strain of a worldwide semicommons.
As an example of a failed online semicommons, consider Usenet, a distributed set of message boards. 212 Its use of interconnected servers to 210. This point may have implications for Zittrain's goal of stopping malware through "suasion" and "experimentation." ZITTRAIN, supra note 2, at 173. Zittrain's discussion of the challenges and goals of the StopBadware project clearly recognizes the dangers of both too much and not enough private control, at multiple scales. with each other via a peer-to-peer protocol. 216 Each server talks only to a few others, but most Usenet servers are linked together so that any given message will eventually be propagated to all servers in the network. 217 This technical structure coexists with Usenet's semantic structure: a hierarchy of topical "newsgroups." 218 That hierarchy, established in 1987 in a coordinated event known as the "Great Renaming," divides the Usenet universe into "newsgroups" such as soc.culture.welsh (on Welsh culture) and sci.math (on mathematics). 219 Individual messages are typically posted to a single newsgroup, but replicated across the whole network of servers. 220 The administrators of individual servers decide which newsgroups to carry on their servers. 221 Usenet also sported a higher level of governance (of the sort detailed by Ostrom) 222 in its institutions for collective decision making about which newsgroups to support. 223 A centralized board coordinated the process: a proposed new newsgroup (or proposed deletion of an old one) would be publicly announced, discussed, and put to a vote. The certified results of this process were generally accepted as legitimate by server operators: a proposed newsgroup that won its vote would typically be added by enough servers that it would achieve critical density in the network and connect those users who wanted to join it. 224 Once again, the semicommons structure is evident. Each server is a private use; each newsgroup is a common use. The two are inextricably intertwined. The worldwide network of servers gives each newsgroup a 216. This exchange originally took place through direct telephone-line connections between Usenet servers; as the Internet became more widely available, the exchanges gradually switched over to using the Internet for their transport. See HAUBEN & HAUBEN Through the 1980s and into the mid-1990s, Usenet was a highly successful semicommons, reaching more than 2.5 million people by 1992. 227 Both boundary-setting devices-between servers and between newsgroups-played a role. Dividing Usenet across servers (rather than centralizing it) made it technically feasible and enabled it to grow by accretion as individual server operators connected and joined the semicommons. 228 Meanwhile, dividing Usenet into newsgroups supported the formation of smaller communities capable of exercising good internal governance. Strong social norms of netiquette discouraged off-topic posts, for example: a post about football in sci.math would draw a scolding. 229 The norms of sci.math and the norms of soc.culture.welsh could be different, making both stronger.
How Usenet Failed
But past performance is no guarantee of future results, and Usenet didn't deal well with the Internet's massive surge in popularity during the 1990s. As the number of new Internet users increased exponentially year after year, so did the technical and social strains on the Usenet semicommons. 230 The most visible form of abuse was spam: messages (usually, but not exclusively, commercial) posted to thousands of newsgroups at once. It placed enormous technical burdens on the private infrastructure and substantially degraded the readability of the common newsgroups. 231 Both 225. See RHEINGOLD, supra note 212, at 130 ("Usenet is a place for conversation or publication, like a giant coffeehouse with a thousand rooms; it is also a worldwide digital version of the Speaker's Corner in London's Hyde Park, an unedited collection of letters to the editor, a floating flea market, a huge vanity publisher, and a coalition of every odd special-interest group in the world.").
226. Froomkin, supra note 212, at 822. 227. See RHEINGOLD, supra note 212, at 120. The years of publication of the books on Usenet cited in footnote 212 are telling : 1992, 1993, 1994, 1994, 1994, 1995, 1995, and 1997 . See supra note 212.
228. See RHEINGOLD, supra note 212, at 119 ("All you had to do to join Usenet was to obtain the free software, find a site to feed you News and take your postings, and you were in action.").
229. See S. HAMBRIDGE, RFC 1855, NETIQUETTE GUIDELINES (1995), http://tools.ietf.org/ html/rfc1855.
230. In Internet folklore, at least, the tide turned in 1993, as commercial services like Delphi and AOL began offering their millions of subscribers access to Usenet newsgroups, an event known as the "Eternal September"-a never-ending stream of new users as unfamiliar with Usenet's norms as the annual crop of college first-years had been. See WENDY M. GROSSMAN, NET.WARS 9-11 (1997).
231. See Froomkin, supra note 212, at 825-29.
Usenet's property boundaries and its institutions proved incapable of dealing with this influx. Architecturally, Usenet got the property boundaries wrong. Each meaningful community-a newsgroup-was split across many pieces of private infrastructure-servers-and vice-versa. This form of scattering inhibited opportunism by censorious private server operators: other servers could exchange a message even if one server deleted it, 232 and its own users could switch Usenet providers. 233 But it also meant that neither private server operators nor commons newsgroup communities were in a position to deal effectively with spam. The private infrastructure owners couldn't individually take effective action against heavily cross-posted spam and garbage; they each had to monitor all of Usenet, and a message deleted on one server would still crop up on the others.
Meanwhile, the community of readers of a particular newsgroup being overrun also had no good tools to stop the flood. Social norms collapsed under the first sustained assault from outsiders. In 1994, a pair of immigration lawyers advertised their services on over 6000 newsgroups. 234 The outcry was remarkable: not just online condemnation, but also selfhelp denial-of-service e-mail attacks, threats to the lawyers' ISP, and "huge numbers of magazine[] subscriptions in [the lawyers'] names." 235 Legal scholars have discussed the remarkable vehemence of this response, 236 but it's more a sign of weakness than of strength. Effective social norms don't require such extensive enforcement, precisely because they're effective. The immigration lawyers were outsiders to the newsgroup communities they spammed, afraid of no threats the newsgroups could wield. 237 In any event, later events established that social norms were essentially ineffective against spam. Other spammers soon followed, in large numbers. 238 The green-card lottery spam was the proof of concept-the lawyers behind it even published a book of advice for other would-be Usenet spammers, claiming they'd made over $100,000 at it. 239 Efforts at educating new users also proved futile. 240 Without clear boundaries to exclude outsiders and effective enforcement mechanisms, norm-based selfgovernance runs into exactly the barriers described by Ostrom.
In the late 1990s, as these failures were becoming obvious, Usenet citizens (and a few legal scholars 241 ) celebrated instead the possibility of technical self-defense. One older technique was moderation: as on a moderated listserv, messages would be sent to a newsgroup administrator, and only posted after he or she approved them. 242 While effective in dealing with spam, moderation imposes substantial costs on the Comedic potential of a group: it slows down messages as they wait for the moderator's approval, inhibiting conversation; 243 it depends on the volunteer labor of a moderator willing to perform this round-the-clock job; 244 and it allows the moderator to behave opportunistically, shaping or censoring the flow of dialogue. 245 Most Usenet groups were unmoderated, 246 and it's not hard to think of a reason. Moderation doesn't scale.
Newer techniques of technological self-defense fared little better. Consider the killfile: a personal list of users whose messages you don't want to see. 247 Your personal newsreading program hides those messages; they remain on the server for others to read. 248 The killfile sounds like a perfectly speech-friendly system: the killfiler's freedom not to read is respected, and so is the killfilee's freedom to speak and other users' freedom to hear from her. 249 And it does work well enough in small communities for dealing with specific annoying users: a kind of virtual silent treatment. 250 But it fails in a larger commons.
Most of the spammers and trolls are new users you've never heard of (and will never hear from again). 251 Nor does killfiling reduce the technical burdens felt by server operators-the servers still need to carry the messages, even though users ignore them.
Cancelbots failed, too. They take their name from the fact that a Usenet post author can send a follow-up message to "cancel" her original post, thereby deleting it. 252 These messages are easily forged, leading to a selfhelp mechanism for dealing with spam and abuse: just forge a cancel message for the offending post. 253 As the spam problem grew, vigilante Usenet users started automating the cancels, using programs called "cancelbots." 254 In practice, though, cancelbots didn't so much end the Usenet spam wars as escalate them. 255 Spammers vied to send out ads faster than the vigilantes could cancel them; this competition was a wasteful arms race. 256 Worse, spammers themselves could use cancels against their (including killing, marking as read, and sorting messages) in Unison (a newsreader) and Mail.app (an e-mail client) for Mac OS X.
249. See SHIRKY, supra note 212, at 82 ("Kill files perfectly illustrate the burden placed on the reader on Usenet where freedom of speech is as absolute as its gets anywhere. For all intents and purposes, anyone can say anything to anyone. If a certain kind of speech causes upset, it is usually up to the reader not to read posts about those subjects or mail from those people.").
250. This observation is based on the personal experience of the author. I would rather not, for reasons that should be obvious, name the specific newsgroups and mailing lists on which I have resorted to using a killfile.
251. See, e.g., James "Kibo" Parry, Killfiles and You, http://www.kibo.com/kibokill/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2010) (providing detailed suggestions for efficient use of a killfile). Note the assumption that filtering out specific unwanted users will not suffice to make a newsgroup readable; more detailed filtering is required. 254. Cancel FAQ, Part 2/4, supra note 252, at IV.C. ("A cancelbot is a program that searches for messages matching a certain pattern and sends out cancels for them; it's basically an automated cancel program, run by a human operator.").
255. See GROSSMAN, supra note 230, at 75-78 (discussing technical back-and-forth between message posters and message cancelers).
256. See Froomkin, supra note 212, at 829-31 (discussing "Usenet Death Penalty" in which a site considered to be too lax in stopping spam "has every single Usenet post originating from it immediately canceled or at least not forwarded. Thus, every person using that ISP loses the ability to post to Usenet regardless of his or her guilt or, in most cases, redesigning Usenet's technical protocols would have required widespread user and server-owner agreement-but that would also have meant giving up some of the private control and commons freedom that these groups prized about Usenet.
In the end, Usenet's distributed openness left it vulnerable to exactly the pressures Smith identifies: griefers used the commons to strategically target private users, and spammers used the commons without heeding the effects on private infrastructure. 265 Usenet itself is not dead. One can still go to Google Groups or Giganews and participate in ongoing conversations in groups with strong norms that allowed them to weather the storm. But it has nowhere near the relative importance that it once did to the life of the Internet.
ISPs are gradually dropping their support for Usenet newsgroups, 266 and it seems unlikely that the system will ever meaningfully rise again. 267
Why E-mail Succeeded Where Usenet Failed
This diagnosis-bad boundary-setting-is specific to Usenet. The entire Internet suffers from spam 268 -any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from a spam vector. 269 Spam is the most characteristic form of strategic behavior in the Internet semicommons; a commons use that imposes serious costs both on commons and private use. 270 But other applications have managed to cope with the spam problem-because their boundaries are drawn in ways that permit more effective monitoring and enforcement.
Contrast Usenet, for example, with the UGC sites described in the previous section. As detailed above, these sites align commons community with private server infrastructure, giving them governance and exclusion users. 278 This difference means that e-mail servers have defensible borders. I can install a spam filter without disrupting any e-mail except that to and from users on my piece of the network. 279 That lets me experiment with local anti-spam policies without needing anyone else's permission or cooperation. 280 Users, in turn, can choose e-mail providers based on the quality of their spam filtering. 281 In a very important sense, e-mail is less ambitious than Usenet. E-mail may be a common protocol open to everyone, and most e-mail servers may be "common" in the sense that anyone can send a mail to users on them, but e-mail itself is deeply nonpublic. A great e-mail message can only be widely shared through successive forwarding. Some people who might have benefited from it won't ever be on the cc: lists. That's a loss to the commons, and it's a reason that e-mail coexists with all sorts of systems designed to offer more community, like mailing lists and the discussion boards we've already met. But the price we pay for needing to turn elsewhere for a fuller commons is that e-mail actually works.
V. CONCLUSION
In the scholarly debates over the significance of the Internet, the privateversus-common dichotomy looms large. Triumphalists proclaim that the Internet creates new forms of collaboration and that the commons is the way of the future. Skeptics respond that the stability and sustainability of the Internet depend on private ownership. These are the Comedic and Tragic stories, and they animate scholarly controversies in telecommunications, intellectual property, privacy, intermediary regulation, virtual worlds, and almost every other corner of Internet law.
In addition to its analytical virtues in explaining why some Internet systems thrive and others fail, semicommons theory also speaks to these debates. It reminds us not to take the seeming schism between "private" and "common" too seriously. The greatest commons the world has ever seen is built out of private property; the highest, best, and most profitable
